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In this paper we investigate the interrelationships between fertility decisions and 
union dissolution in Italy and Spain. We argue that there might exist a spurious 
relationship between these two life trajectories. The analysis is based on the 1996 
Fertility and Family Survey data for Italy and Spain. Results show that there is a 
spurious relationship between fertility and union dissolution in Italy but not in 
Spain. Nevertheless, in both countries, there is an evident direct effect of each 
process on the other: union dissolution decreases the risk of further childbearing, 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Italy and Spain represent the so called “Mediterranean Model”, that in the framework of the 
Second Demographic Transition differentiates from Central and Northern European 
countries, for showing peculiars demographic trends (Van de Kaa 1987). In the Southern 
European countries, indeed, the transitions to union formation and parenthood have been 
dramatically postponed, and marriage and fertility have decreased as well, at level even lower 
than other countries. But, while in many Western countries cohabitation compensates the 
decline of marriages, and non-marital fertility as well as late age childbearing balances partly 
the decline in fertility, this does not happen in Italy and Spain (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000). 
Italy and Spain are also similar in being characterized by very strong family ties, that often 
provide individuals with the social support not granted by their weak welfare states (Reher 
1998).   
In this paper we focus in particular on fertility decision and union instability. It is well known 
that these two countries are champions in Europe for having achieved nowadays the “lowest-
low” levels of fertility (Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002). In contrast, union instability 
although increasing, is still at very low levels if compared with other European countries (De 
Rose and Di Cesare 2003; Houle, Simo and Solsona 1999).  
We argue that fertility decision and union instability are strongly interrelated trajectories that 
together shape one’s family related life-course. Firstly, there might be a spurious relationship 
between these processes, because they might be simultaneously influenced by individual 
unobserved characteristics (Thornton 1977; Lillard and Waite 1993). Here we propose to 
interpret these characteristics in terms of value orientation: “family oriented” individuals are 
expected to be more likely to have children, and less likely to experience union dissolution, 
while “individualistic” people are expected to have lower fertility and higher union 
dissolution risks. Moreover, fertility and union stability are assumed to affect each other 
directly. Childbearing might induce a lower risk of union dissolution (Willcox 1891; White 
1990) by providing the couple with shared goals and interest (Thornton 1977), and by 
representing important costs in case of a union dissolution (Burges and Wallin 1953; Becker 
1991). Union dissolution might decrease the chance of further childbearing, because non-
marital fertility is very low  (particularly in the case of Italy and Spain) (Conseil de l’Europe 
2002), and by reducing the confidence in future unions’ chances of surviving (Lillard and 
Waite 1993).    
In order to study union dissolution and fertility decision as interrelated processes, 
distinguishing between direct and indirect reciprocal effects, we apply simultaneous hazard 
models (Lillard 1993). In addition, we compare the results we would obtain disregarding the 
(potential) effect of unobserved common determinants on the trajectories under study. We 
use the data from the Family and Fertility Survey for the empirical analyses, for providing 
standardized and detailed information about the processes of interest in the two countries.  
 
2. UNION DISSOLUTION AND FERTILITY DECISION: INDIRECT AND DIRECT 
INFLUENCES  
 
When two individuals enter a formal union, either a marriage or cohabitation, they share a 
decision-making process relatively to the survival of the relationship itself, and to the 
procreation during the relationship. Keeping a stable and satisfactory relationship, and having 
children, might represent two important goals for a union. The importance of each of these 
goals (or of both them) would be strongly determined according to individual value 
orientation, attitudes and preferences (Lestaheghe and Moors 2002; Becker 1996).  
Changes in value orientation, at a macro level, have been found responsible for the main 
demographic trends characterizing the Second Demographic Transition (Lesthaeghe and Van 
de Kaa 1986). The shift from materialistic to post-materialistic needs (Inglehart 1997) has 
contributed to developing an individualization process. An increasing emphasis has been 
progressively attributed to individual independence, freedom, autonomy, and self-
development. Such kind of cultural changes would have played an important part in 
explaining the spread of new demographic behaviors, such as cohabitation, divorce, non-
marital fertility, pre-marital sex, and in postponing transitions implying high levels of 
commitment, as marriage and parenthood. 
At a micro level, similarly, values, attitudes, preferences, influence individual’s 
determination of only one specific life path, over the many possible alternatives (Barber,  
Axinn and Thorton 2002; Jansen and Kalmijn 2002; Bumpass 2002). Several life trajectories 
represent the different dimensions of a life-course. Thus, individuals decide about those 
trajectories coherently, according with own values, to achieve own specific goals (Lestaeghe 
and Moors 2002). For instance, individuals oriented towards family values are likely to 
decide about their employment, union, childbearing, and other careers, consistently to realize 
their family preferences. Thus, they might be likely to experience an early union formation 
(Baizan, Aasve and Billari 2003), and to invest many resources to achieve a stable and    
satisfactory relationship, trying to avoid or postponing union breakdown as long as there is a 
hope for recuperating the relationship (Bumpass 2002). They might also be likely to 
experience an early childbearing (Baizan et al. 2003), evaluating childbearing as a primary 
outcome of a union (Myers 1997; Jansen and Kalmijn 2002). In contrast, individuals oriented 
towards individualistic values might be more likely to give up a union as soon as it becomes 
problematic, or it affects negatively individual satisfaction and well being. They might also 
be less likely to invest in childbearing, being childbearing a time-consuming venture that 
necessarily reduces the amount of time at disposal.  
We expect then that between union dissolution and fertility there might be a spurious 
relationship, i.e. these processes might be simultaneously determined according to same 
individual characteristics. In this paper these characteristics are treated as unobserved, and 
interpreted in terms of value orientation towards family vs. individualistic values. The 
formers are likely to invest more in fertility as well as in having a satisfactory relationship. 
The latter might be less willing to spend resources in family related issues, and in turn they 
might be more likely to experience union breakdown, and less likely to have children. Our 
first research hypothesis then follows: 
 
H1: Individuals more likely to have children are also less likely to experience 
union dissolution (and vice versa). 
 
Decision making processes develop over time, and having already made a decision about one 
process might determine the level of opportunity-cost of decisions belonging to other 
processes. Therefore, the outcome of a life trajectory process might directly affect the chance 
of experiencing an event pertaining to another trajectory (Lestaeghe and Moors 2002). Thus, 
for instance, been enrolled in education might reduce strongly the chance of entering a union 
or parenthood (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Coppola 2004).  Similarly, we argue that not 
only fertility and union dissolution decisions might have common determinants, but also that 
the outcomes of these two processes might affect each other directly.  
On the one hand, having children might affect union stability. Children have been shown to 
have an impact upon stability in several ways. By increasing marital satisfaction childbearing 
might promote union stability: children indeed may provide the partners with shared goals 
and interests which are translated into satisfaction and stability (Thornton 1977). The 
presence of children delays or prevent the break up of couples who are unhappily married 
(Thornton 1977), representing the cost of children an obstacle to union dissolution (Becker    
1991). In contrast, few children in the marriage represent weak attractions within the 
marriage, low barrier forces, and strong attractions outside the marriage (Wineberg 1988; 
White 1987; Levinger 1965, 1976). Also the parity of children might affect parental 
relationship (Levinger 1965, 1976; Thompton 1977; Becker 1991). Some authors show that a 
first child reduces divorce probability in the year following the birth (Waite and Lillard 1991; 
Waite, Haggstrom and Kanouse 1985; White and Booth 1985), while it is not visible for 
subsequent births. Thus, our second hypothesis follows: 
 
H2: Having children reduces the risk of union dissolution, and a stronger effect is 
associated with the first childbirth 
 
  On the second hand, union dissolution might affect the chance of having a further 
childbearing for the original members of the couple. Lillard and Waite (1993) have shown 
that the risk of union dissolution delays the transition into parenthood, arguing that being 
children a commitment for the marriage, couples who believe they are likely to split up avoid 
or postpone the decision of having a further child. Such an effect is expected to be even 
stronger once the actual union dissolution is taken into account, instead of the risk of 
experiencing it. We assume that once a union comes to a break, former partners are much less 
likely to have a further child for two reasons. Firstly, given that children belong to a couple 
rather than to each of the partner, union disruption, and the consequent singleness, might 
strongly reduce individual willingness to have a child (Lillard and Waite 1993). Secondly, 
having experienced a union disruption might reduce also the chance and/or the desire of 
forming a new commitment, and the confidence in its stability, and in turn the chance of 
further childbearing (Lillard and Waite 1993).  Thus, our third hypothesis follows:   
 
H3: Experiencing union dissolution decreases the risk of further childbearing 
 
3. UNION DISSOLUTION AS A RELATIVELY NEW PHENOMENA IN ITALY AND 
SPAIN  
 
In modern societies, marriage is a voluntary association between persons. To it different costs 
of formation and disruption belong (Weiss and Willis 1993). From an economic point of 
view, the end of a marriage has two different causes. Firstly, the relationship with a partner 
could be upset when one of the members meets a new potential partner who increases this    
member’s utility. Secondly, many events modify a marriage, which could lead both partners 
to break the union. The importance of these events depends on linked social problems. Union 
dissolution brings an end to the family and it may produce economic conditions that in 
general are insufficient in covering all members’ needs. The solidarity and internal 
redistribution that are typical of the traditional family will no longer function and new 
economic differences will arise between family members (Sgritta 1993). The well-being of a 
single person rests on the community. The negative consequences of a dissolution often affect 
women disproportionately, as in general their economic situation is more precarious than that 
of men (Giddens 1989). 
Rising divorce figures seem to be strongly related to changing gender systems and gender 
relations in society, such as the gradual elimination of gendered items in legal provisions and 
the growing tendency of women to take up paid employment (Lee 1982).  
In Italy and Spain, marriage still seems to play an important social role. Cohabitation is not as 
common as in other European countries, also if it is visible an increase in the proportion of 
cohabitations (Sabbadini 1997; Tobio 2001). This is due to cultural factors as well as to the 
economic and social policies that favor marriage. However, this does not mean that union 
instability is absent. The slow but constant increase in the absolute number of union 
disruption is an indicator of changing family behavior (Figure 1).  
We categorize the potentially explanatory variables of union dissolution in four groups: 
cultural, societal, dyadic and individual (Laner 1978).  
Belonging to the first group, we consider the variable describing the period. We distinguish 
between two main periods: before the seventies and after the seventies. In Europe the 1970s 
and the first part of the 1980s witnessed important reforms in family law like the introduction 
of the divorce and the abortion. We considered that the process started in Italy in the first 
years of the 1970s (1970 divorce law) and in Spain (1981 divorce law) during the first years 
of the 80s have been the consequence of important changes in the values. The 1987 have 
been considered the boundary year between the old set of non secularized values and the new 
secularized ones. Moreover, in Italy the 1987 corresponds to a new reform of the divorce law, 
reducing from 5 to 3 the years of separation necessary to obtain the divorce. Another 
phenomenon related to change in attitudes and values is the spreading of consensual unions. 
Cohabitation is considered strictly correlated to higher probability of divorce (Bennett, Blanc 
and Bloom 1988; Booth and Johnson 1988; White 1987). Possibly, people who choose 
cohabitation do not accept normative marital behaviors, have lower commitment to marriage 
as an institution, and have more secularized values.    
For the description of the societal group we look at the role that paid employment plays in 
family dynamics (Bracher et al. 1993). In particular, we examine whether the presence of 
women in the labor market is associated with a higher risk of marital instability (Booth et al. 
1984; Rank 1987; Spitze and South 1985) paying a particular attention to the amount of  
hours worked weekly, usually found  positively correlated to union dissolution (Hill 1988; 
Spitze and South 1985). 
In the dyadic group, the core of this research is considered according to what discussed in the 
previous section, i.e. the fertility behaviour.  
Concerning the individual group we consider three main variables. Firstly, the age at union 
formation. The younger the person is at the time of union formation, the higher the union 
instability (Morgan and Rindfuss 1985, South and Spitz 1986; Thornton and Rodgers 1987; 
Martin and Bumpass 1989). Secondly, the inheritance of divorce behavior (Mueller and Pope 
1976; Greenberg and Nay 1982; McLanahan and Bumpass 1988). Parental separation is 
likely to lead to the offspring leaving home earlier and forming a union more quickly than 
those whose parents have never separated. In this case, there is a higher percentage of 
cohabitation compared to marriage. Finally, we consider the role of education on the couple’s 
stability: usually the higher the educational level, the more likely an individual adopts non-
traditional behavior (Becker 1991; Blossfeld, De Rose and Hoem 1993; Blossfeld and 
Huinink 1991). 
 
4. FERTILITY AND THE LOWEST-LOW LEVELS REACHED IN ITALY AND 
SPAIN 
 
Fertility is the result of a complex decision making process dealing with when and how many 
children an individual, or more usually a couple desires and can actually have. Much 
emphasis has been given to the trend of first childbearing postponement characterizing the 
western countries during the last decades (Van de Kaa 1987). Such a trend, in the framework 
of the general postponement of the transition to adulthood, finds explanations in the change 
of values increasingly emphasizing post-materialist needs and individual autonomy, self-
realization and well-being (Inglehart 1997). In addition, a prolonged educational process 
(Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Coppola 2004), an increasingly unstable labor market and the 
youth’s economic uncertainty (Oppenheimer 1988; Oppenheimer and Lew 1995), a women’s 
rising participation to labor force (Becker 1991), have contributed to delay the transition into 
parenthood.     
Italy and Spain are characterized simultaneously by an evident postponement of parenthood 
as well as a progressively reduction of the total fertility, becoming champions in lowest-low 
fertility (Kohler et al. 2002). In these two countries fertility has shown a decline between 
years (Figure 2) and between generations. These trends are partly explained by an extremely 
evident postponement of the transition to adulthood, and by a the difficulties new family 
habits face to spread, as shown by the scarce diffusion of cohabitation, and out of wed-lock 
childbirths (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000; Conseil de l’Europe 2002). As a consequence 
young individuals enter a marital union later and less, and childbearing take place later and 
less.  
Among the characteristics likely to influence one’s fertility decisions we consider the cohort, 
because among young cohorts it is visible an attitude to postpone the first child compared 
with older generations. But once they have had the first child, they are increasingly having a 
second or a third, even if these births are postponed longer than before (Pinnelli et al. 2001). 
Women’s  educational level is considered as one of the main causes of union formation 
postponing and consequently childbearing postponing (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Knudsen 
1996; Di Giulio et al. 1999). Generally the attainment of a medium or high level of education 
is associated with a lower and later fertility. In particular, a medium level of education is 
more likely to have an impact on the quantum of fertility, leading more often to the decision 
of not having children at all. A high level of education is more likely to impact on timing, but 
it is less often an impediment to eventual childbearing (Pinnelli et al. 2001). 
Women’s employment has usually and evident impact on fertility decisions, inducing women 
to have less children and later (Butz and Ward 1979; Lesthaeghe and Moors 1995; Kohler et 
al. 2002). This is especially true in Italy and Spain, where the labor market is characterized 
by high levels of rigidity basically due to very similar patterns of employments for women 
and men (Angeli, De Rose and Di Cesare 2004). Conform to McDonald’s (2000) research, 
fertility falls to very low levels when gender equity rises in individual oriented institution, 
like the labor market, but not in family oriented institutions. On the one hand, in Italy and 
Spain there are not special employments for women who want to reconcile work with family 
commitments. On the other hand, family roles in these two countries have been slow in 
adapting to women’s new roles in the labor market (Chesrais 1996), and it is visible a highly 
asymmetric labor division within households, which becomes even more asymmetric after the 
birth of the first child (Palomba and Sabbatini 1993). In addition the very low level of 
institutional and social support to family (Reher 1998) means that more often women have to 
choose between employment and maternity, as not easily compatible alternatives.    
As regards the relation between partners, we consider the type of union. In fact, it has been 
demonstrate that the transformation of cohabitation into marriage has a positive effect on 
fertility (Pinnelli et al. 2001). Also a couple’s separation is taken into account, according to 
what discussed in section 2. 
As far as the fertility process is concerned, we consider the age at childbirth, and the birth 
order.  In Italy and Spain the probability of deciding to have a child decreases with age for all 
birth orders (Pinnelli, Hoffmann-Nowotny and Fux 2001). A negative association between 
the age at first birth and completed fertility has been found (Bumpass and Mburugu 1977; 
Marini and Hodsdon 1981; Morgan and Rindfuss 1985; Kohler et al. 2002). This is true also 
because fertility starts to fall with age from as early as 25, and more rapidly from 35 onwards 
(Menken and Larsen 1994; Wood 1994; Beets 1995), an age at which it has become 
increasingly common to start forming a family. Finally, it has been found that the higher the 
birth order, the lower is the chance of having a further child (Pinnelli et al. 2001). 
 
5. DATA AND METHODS  
 
The analysis is based on the 1996 Fertility and Family Survey (FFS) data for Italy and Spain. 
This survey was conducted in the 1990s in many member states of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe and was coordinated by the Population Activities Unit 
(PAU). The survey provides a (bigger) samples of women, a (smaller) sample of men, as well 
as a third sub-sample of the current partners of women’ s interviewed. In this paper, we use 
the independent female sample. We select a sub-sample of women who have experienced 
first union formation, so to focus on individuals simultaneously exposed at risk of 
childbearing and of union dissolutions. The exclusion of women not in a union does not 
affect the analysis of fertility process, out of wed-lock childbearing being extremely rare in 
Italy and Spain. We have not considered unions ended by the death of partner, because these 
cases are so few that their omission does not influence the analysis in any way. We consider 
first unions, not distinguishing between cohabitation and marriage, because we are interested 
in taking under control both types of union, since cohabitation, even if not widespread among 
the population, is a phenomenon of increasing importance among the youngest generations 
interviewed in the survey. Union dissolution is defined as when the partners do not longer 
live together.  
We have argued that between union dissolution and fertility decision there might exist a 
spurious relationship (i.e. there might be some unobserved common determinants of both    
processes), as well as direct reciprocal causality. In order to verify whether our hypotheses of 
research hold in the context of Italy and Spain, we use simultaneous hazard modeling (Lillard 
1993). Each process is represented through a continuous hazard equation. The outcome of 
each process is introduced as a explanatory variable of the other process, to control explicitly 
for their mutual effect. The effect of unobserved characteristics on each process is 
represented through a heterogeneity term. Allowing for correlation between the two 
heterogeneity terms we control for the effect of potentially common unobserved determinants 
of both processes (Baizan et al. 2003; Coppola 2004). Formally the models can be presented 
as follows: 
 
f f f f
f t Diss t X t A t D t h ε α α α + + + + + = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ln 2 1 0
d d
d t Fer t Y t D t h ε β β β + + + + = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ln 2 1 0       ( 1 )  
 
where  ) (t h
f is the hazard rate of experiencing a further childbearing;  ) (t D f  is the spline 
(with knots at 12, 24 and 36 months) representing the duration of the exposure to the risk of 
having a child since the union formation (for the first parity) or since the previous childbirth 
(for the following parities);  ) (t Af is the spline (with knots at 23 and 28 years) representing 
the age of the woman at the event;  ) (t X is the set of time constant or time varying 
explanatory variables we include in the model: cohort, educational level, employment, birth 
order and marriage;   ) (t Diss f is the time varying variable indicating whether the union 
dissolution occurs (through this variable we control for the direct effect of the other process); 
f ε  is the heterogeneity term representing the effect of the unobserved characteristics on the 
process. Similarly, ) (t h
d is the hazard rate of experiencing union dissolution;  ) (t Dd is the 
spline (with knots at 38, 84, and 180 months) representing the duration of the exposure to the 
risk of union dissolution since the first union formation;  ) (t Y   is the set of explanatory 
variables we include in the model: age at first union, educational level, employment, 
marriage, historical period, parents’ separation;   ) (t Fer is the time varying variable indicating 
whether and how many children the woman has;  d ε  is the heterogeneity term. 
Allowing for correlation between the heterogeneity terms (ρ ) is crucial to control for the 
(potentially) simultaneous effect of the unobserved characteristics on both processes. Thus, 
the error terms are assumed to be time constant and distributed according to a bivariate 
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The models are estimated at maximum likelihood, using the aML software package (Lillard 




We show three different estimated models (Table 1 and 2): firstly we have estimated the 
equations, representing the two processes under study, separately and without including the 
error terms; secondly we have included the error term in each equation; finally we have 
estimated the two equations simultaneously, allowing for the correlation between the two 
processes
1. We show the three approaches to provide a better description of if and how much 
using simultaneous modeling results to be worthwhile, when investigating the 
interrelationships between fertility and union dissolution in Italy and Spain.  
 
6.1 UNOBSERVED DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY AND UNION DISSOLUTION 
 
The estimates obtained through the simultaneous approach are shown below Model 3, in 
Table 1 for Italy and Table 2 for Spain. We discuss the estimates of the simultaneous 
modeling first, and the estimates obtained excluding the heterogeneity terms (model 1), or the 
correlation between them (model 2) in comparison. Whether there exists or not a spurious 
relationship between union dissolution and fertility is indicated by the estimate of the 
correlation between the heterogeneity terms (ρ ). The results show that there exists a negative 
and significant correlation between the unobserved affecting union dissolution and those 
affecting fertility in the case of Italy. In Spain, instead, such a correlation is still negative but 
no longer significant. Thus, our first hypothesis (H1) finds empirical evidence in Italy but not 
in Spain. In the former country, individuals more likely to experience union dissolution are 
less likely to have a further child (and vice versa). In the latter country, there is not any 
                                                 
1 When estimating the simultaneous model, the variance of the heterogeneity term of the union dissolution 
process 
2
d σ  is fixed. Since changing the variance does not have a significant impact on the parameter estimates, 
we prefer to set such a value at the same level obtained when modelling the union dissolution process alone.   
    
indirect effect between the processes once their reciprocal direct effect and the other 
individual characteristics are controlled for. Thus, in the case of Italy the use of simultaneous 
modeling provides a better description of the processes under study and of their 
interrelationship. In the case of Spain, instead, such modeling approach does not provide any 
further information if compared with the modeling where correlation is not allowed (Model 
2). As a consequence, also the estimates of the direct effect of each process on the other are 
quite different when using simultaneous modeling in Italy, while they are very similar even if 
using the different approaches in Spain.  
Concerning the effect of fertility on union dissolution, we notice that in Italy having a further 
child decreases significantly the risk of union dissolution when the spurious relation is 
disregarded (see Model 1 and 2), while such an effect is much smaller and less significant 
when simultaneous modeling is used (see Model 3). Indeed, when using the simultaneous 
approach, only the second or higher parities are associated with a significantly lower risk of 
union disruption. Thus, it is not the fact of having a child itself to induce a lower risk of union 
dissolution, but also those individual unobserved characteristics that induce women to have a 
higher fertility as well as a higher union stability. In Spain, fertility induces a significantly 
lower risk of union dissolution only in the case of the second parity, independently on the 
modeling approach used. Thus our second hypothesis (H2) is only partly confirmed, given 
that fertility actually induces a lower risk of union dissolution, but this effect is lower than 
expected. Moreover, while such an effect increases with the parity in Italy, it is not true in 
Spain. Thus the stronger effect is not associated with the first parity as assumed. 
With regard to the effect of union dissolution on fertility, in both countries a union 
breakdown induces a much and significantly lower risk of having a further child. Thus, our 
third hypothesis (H3) is confirmed in both Italy and Spain. As argued before, when the 
simultaneous approach is used the direct effect of union dissolution on fertility is slightly 
lower in the case of Italy.  
 
6.2 UNION DISSOLUTION 
 
In this section, and in the next one, we briefly discuss the effects of the control variables we 
have introduces in the models. Duration of the union: There is not a well defined shape of the 
risk of union dissolution by duration. In Spain it is visible a higher risk in the first years of the 
union and a significant decrease after 7 years of union, while in Italy the risk increases    
significantly between the 7
th and  the 15
th years of union and decreases after 15
th years. But in 
both countries the effect is very small. 
Age at union formation: in both countries there is a quite strong effect of this variable on the 
union stability. Women aged less then 20 have a higher risk of their union ending than do 
women aged 20 or over. The general trend in both countries is that the higher the age at union 
formation, the lower the risk of union dissolution. However, the decrease in risk is more 
pronounced during relatively young ages.  
Parents separation: the parent’s separation affects the risk of instability, confirming the 
strong relationship between parents’ separation and disequilibrium within the children’s first 
union, also in Italy and Spain. It is also likely that an experience of parental separation affects 
the value and the meaning individuals attribute to partnership. The age at which children 
experience their parents’ separation has also an impact on the future risk of their separation or 
divorce. Experiencing parental union disruption during childhood increases significantly and 
strongly one’s own risk of union disruption. Such an effect becomes not significant if 
parents’ separation occurs when the “child” has become an adult (age>18 years). 
Education: in both countries, there is a significant effect of education on the risk of union 
dissolution. This variable is used as an indicator of the changed status of women in society. In 
Italy, the higher is the educational  level of women, the higher is the risk of union dissolution. 
In Spain the higher risk of union dissolution is associated with a medium level of education. 
Type of union: we have considered marriage as a reference category so as to pick up the 
effect of cohabitation. Marriage represents one of the elements of union stability (in both 
cases: with or without previously cohabitation). This strong difference in the risk between the 
two kinds of union is linked to the meaning of cohabitation. Cohabitation does not have a 
legally recognized status in Italy and Spain. Cohabiters do not have mutual rights and duties 
and either party may consider ending the relationship at any time. The absence of any legal or 
recognized protection automatically gives instability to this kind of union. Hence, 
cohabitations have a much higher risk of breakdown than marriages in both countries.  
Employment: being employed induces a higher risk of union disruption for women when 
compared with the unemployed and housewife category. This conclusion is valid when 
looking at the whole category of employed people. Considering subgroups by hours of work, 
we notice that the group of women that work more than 45 hours a week, experience a much 
higher risk of union dissolution. This in true in both countries, and in Italy the difference with 
the other categories is wider. This result confirms our assumption that the absence of union 
stability is strictly linked to the new behavior and habits accessible to women. The changing    
behavior of women has not been matched by the necessary changes needed in a relationship. 
If the woman is not at home for many hours, it represents a shock to the equilibrium of the 
couple.  
Period: the process of secularization is associated with an increase in union instability, but 
such an effect appears to be stronger in Italy. This is probably due to the fact that in Italy 




Duration: The risk of having a child by the duration since the beginning of the union (for the 
first parity), or the previous birth (for the following parities) shows a similar pattern in both 
countries. It rises during the first year, then it decreases during the second year, it rises again 
during the third year, and decreases later on. In both countries, when considering 
simultaneous modeling (Model 3), the decrease during the second year loses significance, 
suggesting a reverse V shape with a knot at the end of the third year.  
Age at childbirth: the higher is the age at childbirth, the lower is the risk of having a further 
childbirth. Such a trend is significant and strong in both countries.  
Cohort: broadly speaking the more recent is the cohort, the lower is the risk of a further 
childbearing in both countries. The youngest Spanish cohort represents an exception to this 
trend role, in fact the negative effect of the cohort is weaker than that of the previous cohorts 
and it is quite similar to that of the Cohort 56-60. It is probably due to a change in attitudes of 
the youngest generations. The cohort effect is stronger when including the heterogeneity 
(Model 2) and the correlation (Model 3). When controlling for the effect of unobserved 
determining a higher predisposition towards high fertility, the decrease in the risk of having a 
further childbirth by cohort is more evident. Possibly the effect of reducing fertility, due to 
changes in terms of culture, values, and socio-economic context faced by the different 
generation appears more clearly. 
Education: education affects the risk of a further childbirth as we expected. In Italy, having a 
medium level of education is associated with a lower fertility much more than a high level of 
education. Higher educational levels might be associated with other individual characteristics 
and resources that ease women’s reconciliation of family related and non family related roles 
(i.e. higher economic resources, more flexible position in the labor market). This is not true in 
Spain, where the higher is the educational level, the lower is the chance of a having a further 
child.     
Employment: When increasing the number of working hours per week, the probability to have 
a further child decreases. Only in Italy, a slight recover for women who work for many hours 
(more than 45) is visible; the explanation could be find in the major financial resources of 
these women, that allow them to afford all the services they need to conceal employment and 
fertility. The main difference between the two countries is represented by the category of the 
self-employed workers: while in Italy they have the lowest probability to have a next child, in 
Spain self-employed women have the second highest probability, after the category of 
housewife. It could be due to country differences in the composition of the category of self-
employment. Self-employment in Spain might allow for a higher flexibility and in turn to an 
easier conciliation of employment a fertility.  
Parity: in both countries, the higher is the parity, the lower is the risk to have a further child. 
Thus, women in a union actually aim to have at least one child, but not necessarily more than 
one.  
Type of union: married women have a much higher risk of having a further child than 
cohabiting women do, and this is true in both countries. Such a result confirms that in Italy 
and Spain fertility is phenomena mainly associated with a traditional family structure, and 




We have argued that fertility decision and union dissolution are two individual trajectories 
deeply interrelated (Lillard and Waite 1993), because both them contribute to define one’s 
family related life course. Having one or more children and a stable relation and satisfactory 
relationship are indeed two of the main goals of an individual once he or she enters a union, 
either a cohabitation or a marriage. Thus, there might be some unobserved characteristics  
that might affect simultaneously individual decision about having a further child, and about 
giving up a relationship (Lillard and Waite 1993; Thornton 1977). We have proposed an 
interpretation of these unobserved characteristics potentially affecting decision making 
process about both trajectories in terms of individual value orientation. This interpretation 
belongs to the reasoning that actually values orientation contributes to determine the 
spreading of new demographic behaviors at macro level (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2002), and 
influence individual decisions about different life trajectories at micro level (Jansen and 
Kalmijn 2002). We have argued that possibly individuals are oriented towards family values 
or, in alternative, individualistic values. The formers are more likely to invest more resources    
in the family (Jansen and Kalmijn 2002). Thus, they might behave in order to realize a higher 
fertility, and achieve a satisfactory and stable relationship. In contrast, individualistic persons 
are less likely to invest in time and resources consuming activities, as children and a 
relationship are, and therefore they might behave in order to have less children, and give up a 
relationship as soon as it is not enough satisfactory.  
Our arguments find empirical evidence in Italy where women who for unobserved individual 
characteristics are more likely to have a further child, are also less likely to experience union 
dissolution. Thus, we interpret that the Italian women oriented towards family are prone to 
have more children, and a stable relationship, while those oriented towards individualistic 
values have a lower fertility and a higher chance to breakdown their relationship. This result 
holds also if the direct effect of the outcome of each process on the other, as well as the other 
individual characteristics affecting the processes under study, are taken into consideration.  
In the case of Spain, instead, the effect of unobserved characteristics or, according to our 
interpretation, of value orientation is not worth of consideration once the direct effect 
between union dissolution and fertility, and the other individual characteristics influencing 
these trajectories, are controlled for. We suggest that this result does not imply that value 
orientation does not influence individual behavior in Spain, but only that once the effect of 
other individual characteristics and life trajectories (i.e. education, employment, union 
formation) are explicitly considered, then the explanatory power left to values is much 
smaller than in Italy. 
Nevertheless, as we assumed, in both countries there exists a direct effect between fertility 
decisions and union dissolution. On the one hand, having a child decreases the risk of union 
disruption, even if such an effect is lower that what expected. Thus, children represent a 
strong tie for the couple, providing shared goals and interests to the partners (Thornton 1977), 
as well as an economic obstacle to union dissolution (Becker 1991). On the other hand, union 
dissolution strongly decreases the risk of further childbearing. A union breakdown represents 
an obstacle to further fertility, by removing for a time the natural environment for having 
children, and by potentially reducing individual confidence in the stability of the next 
relationship, that in turn decreases the chance of having further children (Lillard and Waite 
1993).  
Italy and Spain are usually considered very similar countries not only because of the 
demographic patterns they witness (Van de Kaa 1987), but also for the welfare states they 
rely on, and the roles played by the different institutions (Esping-Andersen 1999). Among 
these, for instance, the family is fundamental in both countries, because through solid ties, it    
provides strong support to individuals when facing transitions and important life experiences 
(Reher 1998). For these reason when investigating demographic processes in these countries 
usually same results are expected. In our case, this is partially confirmed, because union 
dissolution and fertility appear to be affected by individual characteristics and by each other 
in a similar manner. However, the existence of a spurious relationship between union 
dissolution and fertility, that we were expecting in both countries, finds confirmation only in 
Italy. Such a difference might belong to those country differences that, even if much smaller 
if compared with other western countries, still hold. It would be interesting to dedicate future 
research focusing on the differences between these countries instead of their similarities. The 
comprehension of what makes the difference in similar contexts might provide a better inside 
in the phenomena under study.  
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 (With Correlation) 
  B SE    B SE    B SE   
Union stability 
Marital duration: spline 
(months)     
0-36 months  0.0139 0.0108 0.0175 0.012 0.0118 0.0113 
36-84 months  0.0002 0.0067 0.0016 0.0069 -0.0021 0.0071 
84-180 months  0.0078 0.0033** 0.0082 0.0035** 0.0069 0.0034** 
d180+ months  -0.0098 0.0043** -0.0096 0.0044** -0.0099 0.0044** 
Constant  -8.1406 0.3403*** -8.5621 0.6605*** -8.6902 0.3555***
Age at  first union (<20)     
20-22 years  -0.4667 0.1852** -0.4784 0.2012** -0.4896 0.1966** 
23-25 years  -0.7269 0.2066*** -0.7643 0.2262*** -0.742 0.2218***
>=26 years  -1.0668 0.2642*** -1.1275 0.2971*** -1.1051 0.285***
Parents separation (No)     
Yes, <18 years  1.3072 0.2712*** 1.4101 0.3336*** 1.3876 0.2998***
Yes, >=18 years  0.0549 0.7343 0.068 0.7482 0.0387 0.7492 
Education (Low level)     
Medium level  0.3564 0.1686** 0.383 0.181** 0.4255 0.1817** 
High level  0.936 0.2606*** 0.9639 0.2976*** 0.9942 0.2863***
Type of Union (Marriage)     
Cohabitation 1.9149 0.2233*** 2.046 0.2879*** 2.15 0.2553***
Childbearing (Parity 0)     
Parity 1  -0.6753 0.2018*** -0.7199 0.214*** -0.3845 0.2663 
Parity 2  -1.2925 0.26*** -1.3954 0.2941*** -0.7863 0.4368* 
Parity 3  -1.9798 0.4381*** -2.0905 0.4638*** -1.2557 0.622** 
Employment (Housewife + 
Others)     
Employed <35 hours  0.4211 0.2843 0.4135 0.2957 0.4629 0.2952 
Employed 35-44 hours  0.4662 0.1893** 0.4777 0.1963** 0.5401 0.1962***
Employed 45+ hours  0.8116 0.2168*** 0.8198 0.2286*** 0.8712 0.2298***
Self-Employed -0.0399 0.3375 0.0098 0.3536 0.0757 0.3532 
Period (before 1988)     
After 1988  0.4366 0.164*** 0.4567 0.1714*** 0.4814 0.1705***
Fertility 
Time since last birth: spline 
(months)     
<12 months  0.1878 0.0091*** 0.2184 0.0091*** 0.2184 0.0092***
12-24 months  -0.0324 0.0052*** -0.0073 0.0055 -0.0071 0.0055 
24-36 months  0.0199 0.0045*** 0.0384 0.0048*** 0.0383 0.0048***
>36 months  -0.0172 0.0007*** -0.0138 0.0008*** -0.0139 0.0008***
Age: spline (years)     
<23 years  -0.0477 0.0071*** -0.0483 0.0108*** -0.0464 0.0107***
23-28 years  -0.0596 0.0097*** -0.0447 0.0125*** -0.0458 0.0124***
>28 years  -0.0738 0.0128*** -0.0672 0.0146*** -0.067 0.0146***   
Constant  -4.5334 0.1887*** -5.1002 0.2601*** -5.1628 0.2593***
Cohort (45-50)     
1951-1955 -0.0424 0.0325 -0.0659 0.06 -0.056 0.0599 
1956-1960 -0.1313 0.0351*** -0.2101 0.0631*** -0.2051 0.063***
1961-1965 -0.1891 0.0379*** -0.2925 0.0652*** -0.2882 0.065***
1966-1970 -0.3393 0.0535*** -0.4826 0.0807*** -0.4804 0.0804***
1971-1977 -0.397 0.1177*** -0.5064 0.1597*** -0.4954 0.1596***
Education (Low level)     
Medium level  -0.16 0.0299*** -0.2927 0.05*** -0.2949 0.05***
High level  -0.0432 0.0519 -0.1974 0.0847** -0.199 0.0847** 
Employment (Housewife + 
Others)     
Employed <35 hours  -0.3686 0.0639*** -0.5254 0.0866*** -0.5206 0.0865***
Employed 35-44 hours  -0.5252 0.034*** -0.6777 0.0479*** -0.6784 0.0478***
Employed 45+ hours  -0.3648 0.0466*** -0.5078 0.0673*** -0.5063 0.0671***
Self-Employed -0.4562 0.0673*** -0.617 0.0921*** -0.6199 0.0923***
Childbearing (Parity 0)     
arity 1  -1.0868 0.0344*** -1.706 0.0506*** -1.7088 0.0507***
Parity 2  -2.1586 0.052*** -3.2065 0.0753*** -3.2084 0.0753***
Parity 3  -2.2183 0.072*** -3.7979 0.1048*** -3.7997 0.1046***
Union dissolution (No)     
Yes -0.7598 0.1359*** -0.8495 0.1581*** -0.6375 0.1845***
Type of Union 
(Cohabitation)     
Marriage 0.9085 0.1009*** 1.3101 0.1192*** 1.3252 0.1193***
        
Unobserved heterogeneity 
Fertility εf     0.8281 0.0312*** 0.8296 0.0312***
Unobserved heterogeneity 
Stability εd     0.8077 0.5573 0.8077  










    
TABLE 2 – MODEL ESTIMATES FOR SPAIN 
 
Model 1  
(Without 
Heterogeneity) 
Model 2  
(With Heterogeneity)
Model 3  
(With Correlation) 
  B SE    B SE    B SE   
Union stability 
Marital duration: spline 
(months)        
0-36 months  0.0287 0.0095*** 0.0382 0.0128*** 0.037  0.0102***
36-84 months  0.0043 0.0057 0.009 0.0067 0.008  0.0062 
84-180 months  -0.0075 0.0038** -0.0069 0.0039* -0.0073  0.0039* 
d180+ months  0.006 0.0039 0.0063 0.004 0.0062  0.004 
Constant  -8.3753 0.3279*** -9.1425 0.717*** -9.1809  0.3611***
Age at  first union (<20)        
20-22 years  -0.6321 0.1749*** -0.8013 0.2214*** -0.8071  0.2051***
23-25 years  -0.7576 0.1982*** -0.9499 0.249*** -0.9503  0.2287***
>=26 years  -0.6159 0.2374*** -0.7983 0.2833*** -0.7973  0.2786***
Parents separation (No)        
Yes, <18 years  0.5216 0.2849* 0.6025 0.347* 0.6035  0.3408* 
Yes, >=18 years  0.7826 0.4425* 0.7639 0.5275 0.7643  0.5332 
Education (Low level)        
Medium level  0.4709 0.1657*** 0.5754 0.2089*** 0.5794  0.198***
High level  0.3951 0.2609 0.4926 0.3159 0.5058  0.3135 
Type of Union (Marriage)        
Cohabitation 2.3451 0.1881*** 2.6905 0.3117*** 2.7249  0.2321***
Childbearing (Parity 0)        
Parity 1  -0.2312 0.2019 -0.3335 0.2252 -0.2541  0.2606 
Parity 2  -0.9454 0.2676*** -1.138 0.307*** -0.9976  0.3574** 
Parity 3  -0.3929 0.3206 -0.6201 0.367* -0.4245  0.4993 
Employment (Housewife 
+ Others)        
Employed <35 hours  0.5198 0.2368** 0.5665 0.2675** 0.584  0.2667** 
Employed 35-44 hours  0.4143 0.1731** 0.4173 0.1867** 0.4383  0.1884** 
Employed 45+ hours  0.6809 0.225*** 0.6318 0.2454** 0.6488  0.2471***
Self-Employed 0.5824 0.4304 0.4745 0.4655 0.4783  0.4664 
Period (before 1988)        
After 1988  0.257 0.1561* 0.2691 0.1717 0.2805  0.1707 
Fertility 
Time since last birth: spline 
(months)       
<12 months  0.1948 0.0099*** 0.2174 0.01*** 0.2174  0.01***
12-24 months  -0.0272 0.0054*** -0.0074 0.0056 -0.0074  0.0056 
24-36 months  0.0255 0.0047*** 0.0397 0.0049*** 0.0397  0.0049***
>36 months  -0.0163 0.0008*** -0.0124 0.0008*** -0.0124  0.0008***
Age at childbirth: spline 
(years)        
<23 years  -0.0372 0.0081*** -0.0329 0.0109*** -0.0331  0.0109***
23-28 years  -0.0566 0.0098*** -0.0472 0.0122*** -0.0472  0.0122***   
>28 years  -0.1471 0.0144*** -0.1403 0.0158*** -0.1405  0.0158***
Constant  -4.9943 0.2117*** -5.4947 0.2779*** -5.4965  0.2776***
Cohort (45-50)        
1951-1955 -0.1941 0.0351*** -0.2355 0.0665*** -0.2337  0.0665***
1956-1960 -0.2593 0.0366*** -0.3129 0.0659*** -0.3113  0.0658***
1961-1965 -0.4435 0.041*** -0.5864 0.0687*** -0.5858  0.0687***
1966-1970 -0.7103 0.0558*** -0.89 0.0837*** -0.8895  0.0838***
1971-1977 -0.2925 0.1025*** -0.3477 0.1386** -0.3465  0.1385** 
Education (Low level)        
Medium level  -0.0952 0.0373** -0.1798 0.058*** -0.1813  0.0581***
High level  -0.1258 0.0673* -0.2742 0.1017*** -0.2749  0.1017***
Employment (Housewife 
+ Others)        
Employed <35 hours  -0.5913 0.069*** -0.7846 0.085*** -0.7851  0.085***
Employed 35-44 hours  -0.5405 0.0373*** -0.7259 0.0488*** -0.7255  0.0488***
Employed 45+ hours  -0.6699 0.0583*** -0.8346 0.0732*** -0.8346  0.0731***
Self-Employed -0.4449 0.099*** -0.5501 0.1243*** -0.549  0.1243***
Childbearing (Parity 0)        
Parity 1  -1.028 0.0364*** -1.5191 0.0472*** -1.5188  0.0472***
Parity 2  -2.056 0.0524*** -2.8839 0.0699*** -2.8836  0.0699***
Parity 3  -1.8782 0.0632*** -3.1111 0.0847*** -3.1105  0.0849***
Union dissolution (No)        
Yes -0.4001 0.1122*** -0.4204 0.128*** -0.3706  0.1477** 
Type of Union 
(Cohabitation)        
Marriage 1.2469 0.0912*** 1.5793 0.1099*** 1.5853  0.1104***
        
Unobserved heterogeneity 
Fertility εf     0.7143 0.0281*** 0.7143  0.0282***
Unobserved heterogeneity 
Stability εd     1.0927 0.3921*** 1.0927     
Correlation σ            -0.0989  0.1629 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 